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Prior work variously ascribes the forward puzzle|the low slope in the Fama (1984) regression of the exchange
rate change on the forward premium|to various model misspecications or statistical problems with non-
stationary forward premia, but no single theory fully succeeds in explaining the puzzle. In this paper we
simultaneously address the model-misspecication problem and the non-stationarity issue. On the basis of
competing hypotheses about the risk premium we consider nonlinear models that all specify the Fama beta
as approximately quadratic or spline functions of the forward premium. We estimate these relations using
overlapping one-month observations for erm-member exchange and forward rates against the dem. The standard
deviations are calculated under the Monte Carlo Method for overlapping observations. Wald test conrms the
presence of such nonlinearities, and the models outperform the Fama in terms of various in the goodness-of-
t measures, but the spline adds little relative to the simple quadratic. To handle the non-stationary forward
premium problem, we decompose the forward premium into a long-memory co-movement component and a short-
term ltered forward premium. In regressions that link exchange-rate changes to the long-memory co-movement
component the forward puzzle worsens, while it is substantially reduced when, instead, the ltered component
is used as the regressor, suggesting that the ltered component loads relatively heavily on expectations and the
slow-moving trend on the missing variable. Beta appears to be an inverse-U-shaped function of the forward
premium. This contradicts the Bansal risk premium and the transaction-cost/limit-to-arbitrage hypotheses, but
is consistent with a Fallen-angel eect, where traders or portfolio managers shun long positions in assets with
danger signals like forward discounts.
Keywords: forward puzzle, uncovered interest parity, tests, Peso problem, risk premium
JEL-codes: G32, G34.The Forex Forward Puzzle:
the Career Risk Hypothesis
Introduction
One empirical puzzle in international nance is the size of the bias in the forward premium
as a predictor of future exchange rate changes. The Unbiased Expectations Hypothesis (UEH)
posits that, in the Fama regression of exchange rate changes on beginning-of-period forward
premia, the slope should equal unity and the intercept zero. However, as shown by Cumby
and Obstfeld (1984), Fama (1984), and many others after them,1 the empirical coecients are
not only systematically below unity, but disconcertingly often even negative. The empirical
results are all the more unexpected as, in unconditional tests over long periods, the cross
section of time-series-average interest dierentials does match the cross-section of time-series-
average rates of appreciation quite well (Backus and Smith, 1993). One interpretation of the
downward bias is that there is a missing variable that correlates with the forward premium,
and a prime candidate is a risk premium.2 Another view is that, because of the near-unit-root
characteristics of the regressor, the usual condence intervals are vastly understated, see Roll
and Yan (2000). True, this would not explain why the Fama-regression betas tend to be so
low; but it would at least stop us from taking negative betas so seriously.
Some of the above issues become even more puzzling if one considers exchange rates within
the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (erm). First, in these rates there is strong mean-
reversion, that is, predictability; so the usual remark that interest rates do not predict because
there is nothing to predict does not apply here (Sercu, Vandebroek and Wu, 2006). Second, in
the erm context also the long-memory property of forward premia is a real puzzle. Member
countries coordinated their monetary policies, which should have led to co-movement in the
interest rates, not randomly diverging rates. Also, it is hard to imagine that expectations
of percentage changes in erm exchange rates would be non-stationary. In light of this, the
1See Froot and Thaler (1990) for an early review; equally excellent and more recent surveys are by Hodrick
(1987), Engel (1996), and Sarno and Taylor (2002).
2Frankel and Engel (1984), Domowitz and Hakkio (1985), Hodrick and Srivastava (1986); Hodrick (1987,
1989), Cumby (1987), Mark (1988), Engel (1996), Hollield and Uppal (1997), Mark and Wu (1997), Backus,
Foresi, and Telmer (2001), and Chinn and Frankel (2002) all fail to explain the forward puzzle well; but see
Bansal (1997) for a dissident view.The Forward Puzzle: Career Risk 2
most likely cause of near-nonstationarity in forward premia would then be the missing variable
(like a risk premium), a conjecture we try to substantiate in this paper. A third reason for
focusing on the erm is that it had clear anchors: the ocial bilateral parities and the admissible
band; the associated multilateral measure of health, the divergence indicator; and the interest
dierential against the dem, which was even canonized as an emu accession criterion later on.
These elements are useful to test a new hypothesis about the forward bias, inspired by the
fallen-angel eect in stock markets: bearing in mind their career prospects, portfolio managers
shun assets that fell badly, in the recent past, or emit other very visible danger signals.
In the remainder of this intro we outline the paper's more technical ingredients: we study
a non-linear relation, we lter out the long-memory component of the forward premium, and
we take into account the near-unit-root problem in our signicance tests.
Non-linearities have long antecedents as a potential explanation of the forward puzzle. Such
a non-linearity can arise because the risk premium is approximately quadratic in the forward
premium, as Bansal (1997) points out. The non-linearity could also be due to transaction
costs3 or \limits to arbitrage"4, notably when traders ignore gains that are of insucient
size relative to risk or transaction costs. Lastly, the risk premium could come from a career-
risk-premium eect, where any danger signal, like a pronounced forward discount, adds to
the portfolio manager's reluctance to invest. Like the Bansal and transaction-cost models,
the career-risk hypothesis proposes a particular nonlinear model that can be written as a
Fama regression whose slope, beta, varies depending on the forward premium. In this paper
we specify the Fama beta as a quadratic function or even a quadratic spline of the forward
premium. We estimate these nonlinear models using overlapping one-month observations for
emu-member exchange and forward rates against the dem. Wald test conrms the presence
of the nonlinearities, and the models outperform the Fama version in terms of all standard
goodness-of-t measures, but the spline adds little relative to the simple cubic. The cubic
model produces an inverse U-shaped beta plot, supporting the Fallen-angel hypothesis, as we
shall see.
Our second ingredient, after non-linearity, is ltering. Filtering is inspired by the fact that,
if forward premia are nonstationary, then this must come from either the expectations, or the
risk premium (or, more generally, the missing variable), or both. In the erm, expectations are
3Huisman et al. (1998), Obstfeld and Rogo (2000).
4Lyons (2001), Villanueva (2005), Sarno, Valente and Leon (CEPR 2006), and Baillie and Kili c (2006).The Forward Puzzle: Career Risk 3
even less likely to be unit-root than in other data, so our money is on the risk premium. We
decompose the time series of forward premia into a Hodrick-Presscot \trend" (which turns out
to be non-stationary) and a stationary ltered component, and we re-run our generalized Fama
regressions with either this long-run-memory component or its ltered part as the regressor.
Consistently with the idea that the long-memory part is more closely related to the risk pre-
mium while the ltered component loads more heavily on the expectations, we see that betas
for the ltered premia are much higher, while those of the \trend" component in the forward
premium are clearly negative. In both betas, though, there is an inverted U shape, suggesting
that the fallen-angel or career-risk factor has both long- and short-memory components.
As our third ingredient|handling non-stationarity|all our signicance tests are based on
Monte Carlo simulations where forward premia have strong memory and where, like in our
data, the observations periods overlap. Thus, we unite Roll and Yan (2000) with Hansen and
Hodrick's (1980) earlier correction for overlapping observations under ols assumptions.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 1 we review the non-linear models and
our way of empirically implementing them. In Section 2 we describe the ltering, in Section 3
we come to the main results and in Section 4 conclude. The appendix explains the application
of Monte Carlo Simulation.
1 Non-linear variants of the Fama regression
1.1 Some earlier non-linear models
Huisman et al. (1998) condition the Fama regression coecients on the day-by-day cross-
sectional variation of forward premia. They start from a particular view on where the missing
variable comes from: friction in the market. Since real-world markets are subject to transaction
costs, they argue, uncovered interest arbitrage cannot perfectly align expected exchange rates
and forward premia. Most of the time, expectations of exchange rate changes are so small and
diuse that this friction-induced noise between expectations and premia largely obscures the
theoretical parity between the two. However, there may be occasions where the market does
expect unusually large changes; and if the impact of friction is essentially unaected by the
size of the expected change, then in these instances the signal-to-noise ratio must be relatively
favorable. Highly positive or negative forward premia should therefore be better predictors
than small premia. Cast in familiar statistical terms, the Fama regression suers from an
errors-in-the-regressor type bias towards zero, and for a given variance of the noise term thisThe Forward Puzzle: Career Risk 4
bias can be reduced by constructing a subsample where the variance of the regressor is larger.
Huisman et al. test this model using panel techniques with a cross-currency constraint that
ensures numeraire-invariance of the estimates. They report that large-variance observations
generate Fama regression coecients close to unity, and even substantially above unity if the
denition of "large variance" is very strict.
Huisman et al.'s approach is similar, in spirit, to an earlier regression by Bilson (1981),
who works with an equation of the type
~ st; = It  [1 + 1ft;] + (1   It)  [0 + 0ft;] + t;; (1.1)
where ~ st; is the percentage change, or log change, in the spot rate in the period [t; t + ]; It
is an indicator that the forward premium observed at t is among the n percent most extreme
observations; and ft; is the percentage or log forward premium at t for delivery at t+. Thus,
in both Huisman et al. and Bilson the Fama regression abruptly switches between parameters
(1;1) and (0;0) depending on whether the forward observation is extreme. One can
experiment with the criterion n | e.g. the ve, ten or twenty percent biggest premia|and
see which one works best.
The more recent Limits-to-Arbitrage literature comes up with transition functions that are,
basically, smoother and more exible variants of the Bilson equation. The Sarno et al. variant,
for instance, would read like5
~ st; = [1 + 1ft;] + (ft;;)  [2 + 2ft;] + t;; (1.2)
with (ft;) := 1   exp

 (ft;)2
.  is an inverse bell-shaped function that assigns zero
weight to the (2;2) version of the regression when jfj is zero, and almost unit weight when
jfj is very large. Accordingly, Sarno et al. hypothesize that while 1 and 1 may be close to
zero, we still have 1 + 2 = 0 and 1 + 2 = 1.
Bansal (1997) takes a very dierent perspective, focusing on the risk premium instead of
friction. He starts from an orthodox ccapm equilibrium asset pricing model, and establishes
that its currency risk premium is approximately quadratic in the forward premium. Thus,
the entire relation between expected change and forward premium becomes quadratic|inverse
U-shaped, to be more precise. In his tests, Bansal approximates this by a piecewise-linear,
5The argument in their  is the expectation, not the premium. Baillie and Kili c (2006) do use the premium
(in a logistic transition function).The Forward Puzzle: Career Risk 5
Table 1: Overview of the nonlinear models
Model rp in terms of f  in terms of f
Huisman et al. (1998) U-shaped or
and limit-to-arbitrage | inverse bell pattern
Bansal (1997) { U-shaped pattern:  negative linear in f
{ V-shaped approximation:  > 0 for f < 0 ;  < 0 for f > 0
Fallen-angel hypothesis Cotangent shape, inverse U or inverse V,
possibly asymmetric possibly asymmetric
Key: "rp" denotes the risk premium, "" the Fama (1983) beta and "f" the forward premium.
inverse V-shaped relation, with an output that is immediately interpretable:
~ st; = I+
t  [+ + +ft;] + (1   I+
t )  [  +  ft;] + t;; (1.3)
where I+
t is an indicator that the forward premium for period t is positive. Thus, in this model
the Fama  changes discretely around f = 0; the hypothesis is that positive fs have a negative
 and vice versa. If the approximation of the inverse U-shape by an inverse V is omitted, the
Bansal equation can be written as involving a beta that, itself, is negative linear in f, thus
producing the overall quadratic relation between the expectation and the forward premium.
Table 1 sums up the models.
1.2 The Fallen-Angel Hypothesis
Our own tentative explanation is inspired by Sercu and Vinaimont's (2006) work on Peso
risk, which seemed a promising but ultimately unsuccessful candidate explanation for the
forward bias in the private ecu. Like the original Peso hypothesis, our hypothesis invokes
\dark matter", risks not observed by the econometrician. In the original Peso version, the
dark matter is a low-probability, huge change. The potential change being huge, it does
aect the expectation and therefore the forward premium; but in a nite sample the low-
probability change may never be observed, so that the statistician would conclude that the
forward premium systematically mispredicts the future spot rate.6 One problem with this view
6For this to aect the regression coecient rather than the intercept, the Peso risk must be time-varying and
correlated with the forward premium. A plausible mechanism is as follows. When bad news about the foreign
currency hits the market, the spot rate drops. But the concomitant selling of short-term paper (or borrowing
against deposits) also pushes up the foreign interest rate, thus seemingly foretelling a further drop|or, if youThe Forward Puzzle: Career Risk 6
is that most of the empirical evidence comes from oating rates, and one wonders what the
huge Peso event might be if there is no system of interventions or exchange restrictions that
keep the accumulating tensions bottled up for longish times. If one accordingly rejects the Peso
view as implausible for oating rates, then it may seem that we are only inches away from
the overreaction hypothesis. In this view, the huge change fails to materialize not because its
probability is low, but because it exists only in the minds of the traders. People are subject to
bouts of panic or overoptimism, causing soon-corrected movements in spot rates accompanied
by changes in interest rates in the opposite direction. This fads & fashions view is what Sercu
and Vinaimont ultimately come to for the private ecu.
Our own dark-matter variant, in contrast, invokes no such irrationality. The starting point
is that the market is dominated by professional investors (traders or portfolio managers), not
individuals playing with their own stakes. For a professional, the ultimate decision criterion
is the portfolio manager's career and remuneration prospects. This is not the same as the
return on the portfolio to be managed because PV-ed remunerations and reputation are not
linear in the portfolio return, and depend also on how and when any losses have occurred.
Imagine, again, bad news about a foreign currency, immediately showing up in a falling spot
rate and a falling forward premium (rising foreign money-market rates). The manager may
play it safe and liquidate the foreign positions, thus risking to miss a recovery; or she may act
contrarian and stay long, risking a further drop in the spot rate. In making the choice she
will note that a cash loss looks worse than an opportunity loss, in general. But a cash loss
from being contrarian (when there has been a clear and publicly observable bad initial signal)
looks much worse than an opportunity loss from missing a rally which, judging by the initial
forward premium, was deemed to be rather unlikely anyway. Any cash loss from going against
the ow will be met with the comment that the trader \should have seen it coming", but the
opportunity loss from following the consensus signal will not. In short, when bad news hits
the market, professional investors head for the exit even if there is an expected gain from the
subsequent recovery, because the expected gain from the recovery is counterbalanced by a dark
matter, the potential damage to the professional investor's career if expectations turn out to
be wrong. In the stock market this is known as the \fallen angel" eect: stocks that did badly
are shunned by portfolio managers and, therefore, generate high returns.7
wish, slowing down the immediate drop. If the Peso event then fails to materialize, the peaking forward premium
tends to be followed by a recovery in the spot rate, producing the negative regression coecients.
7See Ikenberry, D., Lakonishok, J. and Vermaelen.T. (1995).The Forward Puzzle: Career Risk 7
This particular dark-matter theory is testable, unlike the strict Peso view or its (statistically
indistinguishable) overreaction counterpart, because it does not involve invisibles. Instead,
it predicts a risk premium for holding currencies with public danger signals. An unusually
negative forward premium would certainly be one such warning light, triggering a positive
extra required return. The amount of expected return the manager is willing to give up is the
career risk premium, which is expected to be positive and large when the forward premium
is negative and to be unimportant when the forward premium is around zero. Similarly, the
manager would be willing to give up some expected return for the safety promised by a markedly
positive forward premium. In short, the missing variable exhibits a cotangent-shaped relation
to f. Note that the relation between the forward premium and the fallen-angel premium needs
not be symmetric. While it takes a large bribe to go against a warning signal and risk a cash
loss, a smaller return shortfall may already be enough to make the trader ignore a positive
signal, because the risk of ignoring the signal is just an opportunity cost.8
Thus, to model the private risk premium as a function of f we chose a negative-sloping
and possibly asymmetric function that is probably quite at when f is close to zero but raises
faster for larger or for more negative values of the forward premium. Let us use the notation
x+ := Max(x;0) and x  := Min(x;0) to denote observations selected by sign. Within the
class of low-order polynomials we could then chose a piecewise quadratic, like  f2
   f2
+ with
 > 0;  > 0, or a piecewise cubic like   f3
     f3
+. The corresponding test equations are,
fallen-angel premium
(quadratic:) Et(~ st;)   ft;   (ft;)2
     (ft;)2
+;
) Et(~ st;)  [1 +  (ft;)     (ft;)+]ft;; (1.4)
(cubic:) Et(~ st;)   ft;    (ft;)3
     (ft;)3
+;
) Et(~ st;)  [1    (ft;)2
     (ft;)2
+]ft;: (1.5)
Thus, here the betas are predicted to be inverted U- or V-functions of f.
While it is not dicult to test whether the predicted patterns are present or not, nding
that they are does not necessarily mean that they reect a fallen-angel eect. Thus, before
starting the main tests we want to verify whether it is generally true that danger signals
8This would be even more so if the foreign currency is exotic and the home currency a major one. True, the
international market is a mix of various nationalities; and if the pattern is as described above, then we have the
opposite pattern if we change numeraire. But it is also a fact that more managers report in, say, gbp or usd
than in dkk or bef; thus, if there is an asymmetry in the private risk premia, the bigger currency's point of
view is likely to dominate.The Forward Puzzle: Career Risk 8
other than the forward premium seem to generate a fallen-angel risk premium. If so, this
nding would lend extra credibility to our interpretation that also a big forward premium is a
fallen-angel signal.
1.3 Preliminary Tests: do Danger Signals Lead to Excess Returns?
The currencies we work with are the Belgian Franc (bef), German Mark (dem), Danish Krone
(dkk), French Franc (frf), Dutch Guilder (nlg), Spanish Peseta (esp), Irish Punt (iep),
Italian Lira (itl) and Austrian Schilling (ats). All data are acquired from DataStream. We
use weekly observations on one-month forward contracts, and the sample period is from January
1st, 1976 to December 31st, 1998 (1200 observations). The one exception is the iep, whose
Datastream coverage starts on April 2nd, 1979 (1030 observations). The future spot rate is
the spot rate on the delivery day, two working days plus 30 days after the date when the
transaction is agreed. dem works as the base currency; that is, exchange rates equal the value
of one dem in units of the other currency.
Let us dene the excess return, Re
t;, as the exchange-rate change in excess of the forward
premium. Under the ueh the expected excess return should be zero in absence of the risk
premium and irrational expectations. In the modied Fama regression,
Re
t; := ~ st;   ft;
=  + (   1)ft; +
X
j
jXj;t + t;; (1.6)
the intercept  and slope ( 1) should both equal zero under the null hypothesis. In addition,
extra regressors Xj should have no explanatory power. In this section we verify whether
excess returns load positively on danger signals other than the forward premium, as our fallen-
angel hypothesis predicts. As possible proxies for danger signals, we select the following seven
variables related to the divergence indicator and to recent trends in the spot rate over one day:
1. Position in the erm band
The European Exchange Rate Mechanism (erm) was built around the ecu, a basket of
all eu currencies. For each currency there was a target value in the basket, called central
parity. Whenever the actual value of the ecu moved too far from the central parity, the
member state had to take \policy measures" to bring back its currency into line. The
divergence indicator (d) provides the signal. It is calculated as the divergence between
the actual value and central parity of the ecu, in units of home currency as a percentageThe Forward Puzzle: Career Risk 9
of the allowed maximum divergence,9
d :=
[actual value   central parity]=central parity
maximum divergence
(1.7)
A positive d means a strong ecu, that is, a weak home currency and therefore, under
the career-risk hypothesis, a risk premium for holding it. Since the exchange-rate data
in the tests are units of home currency per dem, the career-risk risk premium on home
currency translates into a negative risk premium for holding dem. That is, the relation
between our risk premium and the d should be negative.
The longer the time the divergence indicators has been positive, the worse the signal.
Two versions of the d are considered that measure the persistence of the d: weekly and









2. Change of the position within the band
A weakening of home currency against the ecu could be another danger signal, over and
above the level of the d. We look at the change over the last 24 hours:
dt; 1 = dt   dt 1 (1.9)
A positive change means a strengthening ecu, that is, a weakening home currency. Like
a positive level of the ecu, a positive change should therefore get a negative sign in the
risk premium on the dem.
3. The change of the bilateral exchange rate for the dem.
The variables in the rst two groups are in terms of the basket, the ecu. The d is,
however, a relatively weak constraint in the sense that it looks at the average deviation
of the member currencies from their central parities, not the highest pairwise deviation;
and it may trigger \policy measures" like interest-rate changes but not intervention in
the exchange market. Such intervention is based on the bilateral rates, which should stay
9The maximum divergence depends on the currency's weight in the ecu. Against the dem, for example, the
ecu cannot drop as far as against the iep, since 30 percent of the the ecu is dem and only 1 percent is iep.The Forward Puzzle: Career Risk 10
Table 2: Weights of the Risk Variables in the Principal Components 1, 2 and 3,
and Explanatory Power
1 = 11d + 12dw;t + 13dm;t + 14st; 30 + 15st; 1 + 16st; 7 + 17dt; 1
2 = 21d + 22dw;t + 23dm;t + 24st; 30 + 25st; 1 + 26st; 7 + 27dt; 1
3 = 31d + 32dw;t + 33dm;t + 34st; 30 + 35st; 1 + 36st; 7 + 37dt; 1
weights 
d dw;t dm;t st; 1 st; 7 st; 30 dt; 1
variance
explained
1 -0.58 -0.58 -0.58 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 0.43
bef 2 0.02 0.03 0.03 -0.53 -0.62 -0.56 -0.14 0.26
3 -0.05 0.04 0.03 -0.09 0.15 0.18 -0.97 0.14
1 -0.58 -0.58 -0.58 0.02 0.03 0.01 -0.02 0.42
dkk 2 -0.04 -0.00 -0.01 -0.53 -0.61 -0.53 -0.24 0.26
3 -0.04 0.05 0.02 -0.11 0.17 0.33 -0.92 0.14
1 -0.57 -0.57 -0.57 0.05 0.09 0.14 -0.02 0.43
frf 2 -0.09 -0.10 -0.09 -0.52 -0.64 -0.54 -0.03 0.25
3 -0.04 0.06 0.04 -0.11 0.06 0.08 -0.99 0.14
1 -0.58 -0.58 -0.57 -0.01 -0.02 -0.06 -0.03 0.42
nlg 2 0.02 0.04 0.04 -0.54 -0.61 -0.55 -0.17 0.26
3 -0.06 0.06 0.03 0.07 0.11 0.12 -0.98 0.14
1 -0.57 -0.57 -0.57 -0.05 -0.08 -0.10 -0.02 0.43
itl 2 0.08 0.08 0.08 -0.53 -0.63 -0.55 -0.04 0.26
3 -0.04 0.05 0.03 0.15 -0.05 0.00 -0.99 0.14
1 -0.58 -0.58 -0.57 0.02 0.04 0.05 -0.03 0.42
iep 2 -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 -0.52 -0.64 -0.57 -0.01 0.26
3 -0.06 0.07 0.04 0.03 0.00 -0.01 -0.99 0.14
1 -0.50 -0.49 -0.49 0.17 0.28 0.39 -0.09 0.51
esp 2 -0.14 -0.26 -0.24 -0.63 -0.38 -0.14 0.54 0.23
3 -0.21 -0.15 -0.18 0.10 -0.58 -0.43 -0.61 0.13
within the 2.25% band. We look at the bilateral rate that is most likely to be trouble-
some, for weak currencies: the value in the dem. Changes in that rate are measured in
three time spans: daily, (st; 1), weekly (st; 7), and monthly (st; 30).
st; 1 = lnSt   lnSt 1
st; 7 = lnSt   lnSt 7
st; 30 = lnSt   lnSt 30 (1.10)
A rise in the dem's value means a danger signal and, therefore, a lower risk premium for
the dem.
In short, under the career-risk view all seven potential danger signals should be negatively
correlated with the risk premium on the dem.
Principal Component Analysis (pca) was used to compress the seven dimensions into three
principal components. The empirical result of our pca is exhibited in Table 2. The rstThe Forward Puzzle: Career Risk 11
Table 3: The Predictive Power of the Principal Components
Re
t =  + 11;t + 22;t + 33;t + t
1 2 3 R2
bef 0.0008 0.0003 0.0003 0.024
dkk 0.0005 0.0001 0.0002 0.006
frf 0.0003 0.0005 -0.0001 0.008
nlg 0.0006 0.0004 -0.0002 0.078
itl -0.0008 -0.0003 -0.0002 0.009
iep -0.0003 0.0002 0.0003 0.002
esp 0.0007 0.0003 0.0004 0.002
number of
right signs 5 6 4
principal component 1 can be summarized as the position factor, for in this linear combination
the variables d, dw;t and dm;t have dominant weights relative to the other variables. The second
component 2 can be viewed as the bilateral change factor because of the prominent weights for
st; 1, st; 7 and st; 30. The third component 3 relates to the change in the position, primarily
weighted by dt; 1. Since the main variables have negative weights in their eigenvector, a higher
value of the principal component should be associated with a higher expected return on the
dem; that is, the regression coecient should be positive.
Now, we test if our conjecture is right or not by regressing the excess return on the principal
components in Equation (1.11),
Re
t =  + 11;t + 22;t + 33;t + t: (1.11)
The estimations and the goodness-of-t of the models are reported in Table 3. While under
the null no coecient should be signicant, bar perhaps one or two on a pure-chance basis,
we see fteen starred estimates. The intervention factor 1 has ve times a signicant positive
coecient (the exceptions being the currencies with large forward premia, itl and iep). 2
comes up with a positive value in six equations, albeit with unsatisfactory signicance in two
cases. The third component, 3, has a positive coecient in four equations, although only two
of them are signicant. Most of the wrong signs are insignicantly dierent from zero. For
each currency, the R2 is low but is nevertheless much higher than for the regression where the
forward premium is the regressor. So, the fallen-angel hypothesis acquires some credibility: the
empirical evidence implies that general danger signals other than the interest dierential trigger
higher expected returns, consistent with the idea that career- or image-risk considerations drive
the manager to ask for extra return. We now turn to the forward premium to see whether it
seems to as a danger signal of its own.The Forward Puzzle: Career Risk 12
1.4 Main Test Equation
Our test models are part of the literature that focuses on the risk premium, which explains the
puzzle as a failure to allow for a risk premium in the Fama regression. Generalizing Bansal's
approach, we present two models that approximately t all of the above hypotheses. The rst
one is a cubic model where the risk premium takes the form of higher orders of the forward
premia,
Et(~ st;) =  + 1ft; + 2f2
t; + 3f3
t;
=  + ft; + (1   1)ft; + 2f2
t; + 3f3
t; | {z }
risk premium
; (1.12)
Thus, the Fama beta becomes quadratic in the forward premia in equation (1.13),
(ft;) = 1 + 2ft; + 3f2
t;: (1.13)
Section 3 examines the nonlinearity by testing the joint hypothesis 2 = 3 = 0. If and when
the null of a linear model is rejected, we can check the observed pattern against the alternatives
set forth in Table 1. But the quadratic approximate Fama  may lack exibility; the tails of
an inverse bell shape, for instance, can not be captured. As a more exible alternative to the
cubic model in Equation (1.12), we therefore let the Fama beta be a quadratic spline function
of the forward premia:
(ft;) = 1 + 2ft; + 3f2
t; + d1(ft;   k1)2
+ + ::: + dp(ft;   kp)2
+; (1.14)
In this equation the Fama regression is implicitly revised into a nonlinear form,
Et(~ st;) =  + [1 + 2ft; + 3f2
t; + d1(ft;   k1)2
+ + ::: + dp(ft;   kp)2
+]ft; + t: (1.15)
Familiarly, the quadratic spline function in equation (1.14) consists of two parts: a quadratic
function of f and the plus functions, (f  ki)2
+ := [Max(f  ki;0)]2 for i = 1;:::;p. The pre-set
parameters ki are referred to as the knot points; so the squared positive dierences between f
and the knot points are included into the plus functions. Like a (p + 3)-th degree polynomial,
the spline function is continuous in its level and rst-order derivative, but it allows the second-
order derivative to change at each knot point without any repercussions on the function for
lower values of f. Here, we set the knot points as follows. The percentage forward premia are
ranked by size, and for each currency six knot points separate the whole set of observations
into seven bands. The values of the knots for a given currency are the 5th, 10th, 20th, 80th,
90th and 95th top percentile values of the sample of the forward premia of the currency. NoteThe Forward Puzzle: Career Risk 13
Table 4: Knot-point values of frf for the spline
variable (%) Mini-
mum
knot1 knot2 knot3 knot4 knot5 knot6 Maxi-
mum
Mean S.D.
Cum prob (%) 0 5 10 20 80 90 95 100
f -0.15 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.53 0.69 0.88 2.61 0.33 0.33
b f -0.05 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.53 0.63 0.69 0.98 0.33 0.21
f f -0.52 -0.28 -0.22 -0.12 0.09 0.21 0.39 2.08 0.00 0.25
Key: "f" is the forward premium, "b f" is the co-movement component,"f f" is the ltered forward premium,
"Cum prob" is the cumulative probability and "S.D." is the standard deviation. All the numbers are
expressed in percent.
that the rst band corresponds to the lowest premia, and the seventh band to the highest
premia. While the central zone is wide in terms of frequencies, in algebraical terms it is not
wide because the density is much higher in the middle. For example, in Table 4 we show the
knot points for the raw forward premium of the frf, as well as for its two decompositions to
be introduced in Section 2.
Empirical results are reported in Section 3, but we rst explain how the ltering and the
signicance testing is done.
2 Filtering Out the Long-memory Co-movement in the For-
ward Premia
In this section we consider the near-nonstationarity of the forward premium. Non-stationarity
in a variable invalidates the standard statistical model and makes the usual t-statistics unreli-
able. Regression, in such a framework, makes sense only if the dependent variable co-integrates
with the independent variable with at least one co-integration vector. In Table 5 we show the
results of the Fractional Integration test (FI)10 to examine the non-stationary nature of the
variables on both sides of the Fama regression.
In Table 5, unsurprisingly, the exchange rate changes ~ st; are classied as stationary with
d < 0:5 in all currencies. The forward premia ft;, in contrast, seem non-stationary except
those for the itl. So, the traditional regression has an imbalance problem.
Roll and Yan (2000) speculate on the likely source of the non-stationarity of the forward
10In the analysis of persistency of the time series, we usually consider the order of integration, d. When d is
smaller than 0.5, the process is (weakly) stationary with nite variance. If d equals 0.5 or greater, the process
is non-stationary with innite variance. Innite variance is more general than the unit-root case (d = 1). Here,
we estimate d with Wavelet Ordinary Least Square (wols), See Tkacz(2001).The Forward Puzzle: Career Risk 14
Table 5: Fractional Integration Test
d ~ st; ft; f f !
ats 0.109 0.544 -0.098 |
bef 0.299 0.507 -0.312 |
dkk 0.257 0.608 -0.317 |
frf 0.235 0.572 -0.201 |
nlg 0.109 0.561 -0.043 |
esp 0.239 0.564 -0.294 |
iep 0.184 0.581 -0.363 |
itl 0.205 0.444 -0.310 |
! | | | -0.84
s denotes the spot return, f the forward premium
for horizon , f f its H-P-ltered version, and !
is the estimated common trend in f. If d is larger
than 0.5, the diagnosis is that the time series looks
non-stationary, otherwise, it is viewed as station-
ary.
.
premium. They conceptually decompose the nominal interest rate dierential into the real
interest rate dierential and the expected ination dierential. The real interest rate dierential
might be a unit-root process when there is an economically vast gap between countries, but
that is not the case for the mainstream economies studied in most published tests. So, they
conjecture that the persistence in the forward premium is due to a non-stationary ination
risk premium or a non-stationary expected ination dierential.
An alternative approach is to conceptually dissect the forward premium into the expected
spot-rate change and the missing variable, possibly a currency-risk premium. In principle,
any non-stationary expectations for exchange-rate changes should show up in the Fractional
Integration tests on the realized changes. True, in nite samples there is an issue of power
here: the variability of even a non-stationary expectation may still be small relative to the
white-noise component in ~ st; and, therefore, hard to establish beyond the usual doubt. In
our case, there is a good a priori argument, though: it is hard to imagine non-stationary
expectations for percentage changes in exchange rates that all belong to the erm.
For the missing variable, the plausibility of non-stationarity is harder to gauge a priori as
we do not even know what the missing variable is. But, in a way, we do not need priors: if
observed forward premia are non-stationary or close to it and if we reject unit roots for the
expectations part, then the non-stationarity must come from the residual, the missing variable.
Being likely to be a long-run process in time domain or a low-frequency noise in frequency
domain, we estimate the long-memory component on the basis of the Hodrick-Prescott trendsThe Forward Puzzle: Career Risk 15
in each forward premia series. The Hodrick-Prescott (HP) lter is a standard instrument to
capture the trend in time series. The HP-lter works as follows. A series fj for currency j is




The HP lter estimates the trend from the solution to the following minimization problem
























This objective function consists of two parts: the squared sum of the deviations of the series
from its trend, summing up the badness-of-t of the trend series vis-a-vis the raw data; and the
sum of the squared trend reversals (the dierence between two consecutive rst dierences),
measuring the smoothness of the trend series. , the smoothing parameter, weighs the com-
ponents in the objective. For quarterly data, for instance, it is conventionally set at 1600; we
use the default value in Eviews 5.0 for weekly data,  = 270400. Applying this procedure for
each forward premia series, we obtain a currency-specic trend series ftr
j for every currency j.
Figure 1 shows the eight trends. A strong similarity of the patterns is immediately obvious:
forward premia against dem are generally falling over time, in line with the general level of
interest rates and, at the end, converging with the approach of a single monetary policy under
the authority of the ecb. The existence of important links between the eight trend series is
conrmed when we compute correlation coecients. Panel B of Table 6 shows the correlations
between the eight hp trend components. Most of the values are above 0.60, much higher than
the correlation coecients between the raw forward premia in Panel A. Thus, series-by-series
trends that consist of the sluggish (or, tentatively, long-memory) components of the premia are
behaving quite similarly, suggesting that they load more heavily on one underlying common
trend.
Thus, instead of working with the individual trends we can assume that here is a common
trend, !t, underlying the individual trend variables. The motivation for using one common
trend is that the individual trends may be over-tting their series: by retaining only the
common part, an additional lter is administered. Our proxy for the common component !t is
calculated as follows. We rst scale each trend series ftr
j by its mean,  fj, and we then average
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Figure 1: the HP trends in individual currencies
































































An issue worth raising here is that, because our data set has a small cross-section (only eight
currencies), we still have to consider potential distortion from extreme observations. For
instance, we may have missed some of the data errors in Datastream. A standard solution
is to truncate the input data. So in our calculations, following the normal distribution law,














j;t indicates whether the (j;t)-th trend observation is within two standard deviations
from its median. So, when the value is outside the two- interval, it has no weight in the
average.
The better the individual forward premia fj correlate with the common trend !, the more
co-movement it captures. Panel D of Table 6 shows high correlation coecients between these
two variables, from 0.61 to 0.96, indicating that there are lots of commonalities and that !
t
works well as a proxy for the true co-movement. !
t also has long memory: the unit root canThe Forward Puzzle: Career Risk 17
Table 6: Correlations of f or components (eight currencies against dem)
ats bef dkk frf nlg esp iep itl
Panel A: Raw forward premia, corr(fj;fk)
ats 1
bef 0.139 1
dkk 0.328 0.561 1
frf 0.111 0.681 0.611 1
nlg 0.551 0.313 0.420 0.179 1
esp 0.304 0.455 0.657 0.557 0.362 1
iep 0.277 0.469 0.393 0.453 0.387 0.449 1
itl 0.269 0.684 0.602 0.792 0.266 0.601 0.450 1





dkk 0.736 0.742 1
frf 0.293 0.897 0.739 1
nlg 0.666 0.548 0.767 0.354 1
esp 0.582 0.790 0.887 0.767 0.682 1
iep 0.626 0.860 0.826 0.789 0.672 0.858 1
itl 0.420 0.913 0.795 0.860 0.547 0.908 0.827 1
Panel C: HP-ltered premia, corr(f fj;f fk)
ats 1
bef 0.118 1
dkk 0.257 0.395 1
frf 0.131 0.302 0.346 1
nlg 0.150 0.357 0.298 0.039 1
esp 0.065 0.220 0.269 0.044 0.380 1
iep 0.065 0.071 -0.065 0.058 0.067 -0.027 1
itl 0.227 0.340 0.351 0.367 0.189 0.128 0.003 1
Panel D: corr(!;fj)
correlation ats bef dkk frf nlg esp iep itl
coecient 0.61 0.89 0.91 0.82 0.78 0.93 0.96 0.92
not be rejected by Dicky Fuller test shown in Table 5. Having obtained a single common-trend
variable for all currencies under the hp lter method, we lastly decompose the eight series of











































Below, the tted values b fj;t := j + j!t are referred to as the co-movement component;
and the retrieved residuals j are henceforth referred to as the ltered forward premia, denoted
as f fj, and expressed as f fj;t = fj;t   b fj;t. Figure 2 shows graphs of the ltered premia, forThe Forward Puzzle: Career Risk 18
Figure 2: The ltered forward premia and their trends























































comparison, along with the time series plots of the co-movement components b fj underlying
! in Figure 1. By design, while for the co-movement components|and, by implication, the
common trend|there is a lot of smoothness and inertia, in Figure 2 the random component
is quite strong. A second dierence is that most of time the plots of the ltered premia are
below the plots of the co-movement components. Third, the co-movement component b fj has a
narrower standard deviation than the ltered forward premium f fj. For the frf, this can also
be seen from the standard deviations of f, b f and f f in Table 4.
If our inference that the co-movement component b fj catches the nonstationarity of fj
is right, its complement, the ltered premium f fj;t, may be stationary. Table 5 compares the
Fractional Integration parameter d of the ltered forward premia with the raw forward premia.
In each currency f fj;t has a d smaller than 0.5, indicating that we seem to have a stationary
series after ltering out the co-movement component from f. At the same time, the ltered
premia should also be more independent from each other if the common part does the job
it is expected to do. From Panel C of Table 6, the correlations between the f fs are much
lower than the correlations between the fs, which conrms that the co-movement component
captures most of the correlations in the forward premia.
The fact that the co-movement component is strongly long-memory leads to the conjecture
that it contains little or no forecasts of exchange-rate changes; that is, the presence of thisThe Forward Puzzle: Career Risk 19
common trend may have decreased the predictive power of the forward premium|if at least
the other component, the ltered part, does load more heavily on the expectations and not
just on the transient part of the risk premium. This is what the tests of Section 3 are about.
3 Empirical Results
We start with the non-linear model as applied to the non-ltered forward premia (Sections 3.1
and 3.2), and then we work their common-trend or the ltered components (Section 3.3).
3.1 Nonlinearity Test and Model Evaluation
Table 7 shows the summary results for the linear, cubic and spline regressions. The values for
the standard Fama  in the second column are signicant and positive, a rare result in this
literature. However, we still nd the Fama model is misspecied: there is a clear non-linear
relation between the spot changes and the forward premia. Here, nonlinearity is demonstrated
if the Wald test rejects the null hypothesis of a linear relation, the original Fama model; in
other words, we jointly test whether the coecients 2 and 3 equal zero for the cubic model
or similarly for 2, 3, d1, d2,::: dp equal zero for the spline model. From Table 7 both the
cubic and the spline have ve regressions rejecting the joint tests, indicating the presence of
nonlinearity. The beta plots in Figure 3 also illustrate the nonlinearity.
Next, we evaluate the goodness-of-t in three measures:  R2, Akaike Information Criterion
(aic) and Schwarz Information Criterion (sic). We compare the nonlinear test models to the
Fama linear model in Table 8. The cubic regression outperforms the Fama version in terms of
adjusted  R2 and aic: seven  R2s are better and so are six aics. The sic, the most stringent
measure, still reports four cubic models that outperform the Fama regressions. The spline
regressions also have an advantage in  R2 and aic compared to Fama regressions: all  R2s are
better, so are six aics. Dierent from the cubic model, the spline model does a bad job in
terms of sic: only three regressions get improved betas. An additional comparison is between
these two nonlinear models, presented in the last row of Table 8. The spline is superior to the
cubic only in terms of  R2, but turns out worse in terms of sic for all the regressions. Generally
speaking, the nonlinear models have clearly better goodness-of-t than the linear Fama model
for  R2 and aic, but relative to the cubic the the spline adds little extra and does even worse
in terms of sic.
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Table 8: The Goodness of t: Fama, Cubic and Spline regressions
Fama Cubic Spline
 R2 AIC SIC  R2 AIC SIC  R2 AIC SIC
ats 0.28% -8.598 -8.590 1.11% -8.605 -8.588 1.30% -8.602 -8.559
bef 0.96% -6.899 -6.891 1.06% -6.898 -6.881 2.37% -6.907 -6.864
dkk 0.19% -6.671 -6.663 4.96% -6.720 -6.701 7.16% -6.737 -6.694
frf 6.84% -6.250 -6.242 7.92% -6.262 -6.243 8.88% -6.266 -6.223
nlg 5.13% -8.131 -8.123 5.03% -8.129 -8.112 5.62% -8.130 -8.088
itl -0.04% -4.913 -4.905 0.17% -4.914 -4.897 0.61% -4.913 -4.871
esp 8.46% -4.799 -4.790 10.90% -4.842 -4.807 12.19% -4.834 -4.791
iep 0.18% -5.826 -5.187 9.83% -5.933 -5.912 10.90% -5.932 -5.884
#(Regressions that outperform Fama) 7 6 4 8 6 3
#(Regressions that outperform Cubic) | | | 8 4 0
Figure 3: Beta plot with the cubic models























on the shape of the beta plot. Table 7 reports the estimated mid-point betas of each band.
The estimates turn out to be quite imprecise, though; probably as a result of that we do
not nd any clear pattern. The cubic models, in contrast, produce similar patterns: low or
negative values for 1 (much lower than the standard Fama betas), positive coecients for the
quadratic term in seven cases out of eight, and negative ones for the cubic in again seven cases
out of eight. The results are investigated more closely in the following section. At this point
we conclude that the Fama model is misspecied because of the presence of the nonlinearity,
and is inferior to the nonlinear models in the goodness-of-t. There is, however, no evidence
that we need to go beyond a cubic model. So we now restrict the generalized Fama beta to a
simpler form, a simple quadratic function of the forward premium f.
3.2 The Cubic Model: Further DiscussionThe Forward Puzzle: Career Risk 22
From Table 7, we see that there is a nonlinear relation: the coecients 2 are signicant in ve
cases out of eight and the Wald tests reject the constant beta in ve regressions. Even though
the cubic coecient 3 is never signicant individually (t-test), its sign is always negative except
for the nlg, suggesting that the parabola of the beta plots opens downward. Consistent with
the negative signs of 3, Figure 3 shows that the Fama betas have an inverse U-shaped pattern
in the forward premia. True, the inverse U-shape is not uniform across currencies: we see
only a weak convexity for the esp and the iep, and the nlg actually has a slightly concave
line; but there certainly is no pattern of falling betas in the forward premium that would have
supported the Bansal risk premium, nor is there any U or V shaped pattern as proposed by the
transaction cost or limit-to-arbitrage hypothesis. The only story that seems to be consistent
with the data, in short, is the Fallen-angel hypothesis. In most cases, the max of the inverse
U tends to occur at positive forward premium, 1% to 2%, indicating that the bad vibes seem
to start not when forward premia fall below zero but already when they fall below a critical
positive level.
To control for a possible regimes shift, we now separate the whole sample into two parts,
subsample 1, before August 3rd, 1993, and subsample 2 after this date. Under heavy specu-
lation pressure, on August 3rd, 1993 the erm exchange rate uctuation bands were widened
to 15% around the central parities. Figure 4 depicts the movements of the forward premia.
Compared with subsample 1, the forward premia in subsample 2 move within a much narrower
zone. This might mean that the investors expect less speculation with the wide uctuation
band; but towards to the end of the sample period they surely also anticipated more nancial
integration among erm countries. Whatever the reason, danger signals occur much more rarely
in subsample 2 and the fallen-angel eect should be hard to document.
Panel A of Table 9 summarizes the empirical results from the cubic models for the whole
sample and the two subsamples. The slopes in the rst subsample are quite close to the
slopes in the whole sample. But in the second subsample, there are more egregious numbers,
whether in the coecients 1 or the higher-order coecients 2 and 3. We nd similar results
later, when the regressor is the ltered forward premium or the co-movement component: in
the post-93 period, the regressors show very little variation, and as a result, the estimated
coecients are erratic.
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Table 10: Comparing the ltered premium or the common trend to the original
forward premium in terms of goodness of t.
Number of times the alternative right-hand-side variable beats the original one in terms of t.
R2
f ff AICf ff SICf ff R2
b ff AICb ff SICb ff
whole sample 7 7 6 2 2 2
subsample 1 7 7 7 2 2 2
subsample 2 5 6 6 4 5 5
Recall that the nonstationary forward premium can be decomposed into a long-memory co-
movement component b f and a short-term ltered forward premium f f as described in Section
2. The common component b f is nonstationary and is a good candidate for the long-memory
part of the risk premium or for slow-changing features in the base country's monetary policy
or some other economic fundamentals. Whatever the underlying, the slow-moving component
b f is unlikely to explain the short-term expectation on the forward contracts. In addition, its
nonstationary nature creates statistical problems in the regressions. In that sense, b f might be
responsible for the forward puzzle. The ltered component, f f, in contrast, is stationary and
may be closer to the expectations, but it may of course also pick up any transient component
of a risk premium. Panel B and Panel C in Table 9 test the cubic models where we use each
of these two components as the regressor instead of their sum, the forward premium.The Forward Puzzle: Career Risk 25
Figure 5: Beta plots in terms of the components


























(a) Beta plot with the ltered forward premium

























(b) Beta plot for the co-movement component
Compared with the raw f in Panel A, the ltered forward premium f f produces higher
coecients 1 and more signicant Wald tests in the rst subsample. In addition, f f produces
less egregious slopes in the second subsample. For the whole sample, four regressions have
higher coecients 1 with the f f, and more regressions (seven out of eight) reject the linear
model specication via the signicant Wald test. The co-movement component, in contrast,
brings out much lower and negative coecients in the whole sample and subsample 1, and many
erratic coecients 1 in subsample 2. (In the second subsample, the lack of variability in the
forward premia mentioned above may also contribute to make the betas even worse.) The more
negative 1s are consistent with the idea that the co-movement component is related to the
long-memory part of the risk premium, responsible for the missing variable(s); meanwhile, the
more positive 1s with f f are consistent with the conjecture that the ltered forward premium
f f loads more heavily on the expectation than b f. The cubic slope 3 stays negative in most
cases, demonstrating an inverse U-shaped pattern of the beta in Figure 5(a) and Figure 5(b).
The inverse U-shaped pattern of beta plots in f f again supports the Fallen-angel hypothesis
that the career risk premium of the portfolio managers becomes crucial to the investment
decision when the danger signals appear in the markets. But the pattern is far less pronounced
than for the raw f. With b f as the regressor, in contrast, the pattern is very clear, whether
statistically or graphically.
Table 10 assesses the goodness-of-t |  R2, AIC and SIC | when the cubic model is run
on dierent specications of the forward premia. All three measures indicate a better t for
the ltered forward premia than for the raw forward premia: seven out of eight regressions
show an improvement in the whole sample and the rst subsample; six regressions gain inThe Forward Puzzle: Career Risk 26
terms of AIC and SIC in the second subsample. In contrast, the co-movement component
does worse than the original regressor with six regressions worsening in the whole sample and
subsample 1, and with mixed results in subsample 2. So, the model evaluation is consistent
with our conjecture that the short-term ltered forward premium loads on the expectation or
on the transient part of the risk premium possibly, having higher predictive power; while, the
long-memory co-movement deteriorates the forward prediction, is responsible for the missing
variables.
4 Conclusions
This paper wants to sort out two issues in the forward-puzzle literature: the model-misspecication
problem when a non-linearity is not recognized, and the issue of a non-stationary forward pre-
mium. The latter creates a statistical issue (how does one discover the correct error margins?)
and one of economic interpretation: how can an expectation be non-stationary, especially for
erm currencies?
One idea we bring into this literature is career risk considerations among money managers:
to go against publicly visible danger signals takes either guts or extra expected returns. In an
exploratory test we nd that danger signals other than the forward premium do seem to be
followed by extra expected excess returns. The next question is whether the forward premium
may also double as a danger signal, in which case the Fama beta should be allowed to be a
quadratic function or a spline function of the forward premium. We do nd that a nonlinear
relationship is more proper to describe the relation between the percentage change in spot rate
and the forward premium. Both the cubic and spline regressions outperform the linear model
in terms of goodness-of-t. The cubic model produces an inverse U-shaped beta that rises from
very negative to a higher level as the forward premium approaches zero and dips again as the
forward premium increases further. This pattern again ts in with the Fallen-angel hypothesis
that traders or portfolio managers shun long positions in assets with danger signals.
The second idea we explore is to decompose the highly persistent forward premium into a
long-memory co-movement component and a ltered forward premium that is denitely not
unit-root. The former component associates with a strong common trend. It seems to load
heavily on the missing regressor which, in Fama's conjecture, is responsible for the forward
puzzle: when we run the cubic models with the co-movement variable on the right-hand side,
betas are much lower than for the total-f regressions and the ltered-f f regressions. The shapeThe Forward Puzzle: Career Risk 27
of the betas even provides a clue as to what the long-memory part stands for: it could again
be a Fallen-angel risk premium that makes traders skeptical about assets with danger signals.
The ltered forward premia, in contrast, seems to load on both the expectations and the risk
premium: the betas are generally positive and do a better job indicating the future change,
but also exhibit a (weaker) inverse U-shaped pattern that one expects from career-risk eects.
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A Appendix: Monte-Carlo Standard Deviations
The remaining issue is the reliability (SE) of the estimations. There are two complications.
First, the forward premium (and even more so the co-movement component) is non-stationary
or nearly so. Second, following Hansen and Hodrick (1980) we do not want to waste information
by considering only non-overlapping forward contracts, so we use the weekly observationsThe Forward Puzzle: Career Risk 29
on one-month forward contracts. For either reason, the conventional standard deviation is
underestimated. In this paper Monte Carlo (MC) simulation is employed to calculate the
standard deviation.
Monte Carlo method is a stochastic technique that uses random numbers and probability
statistics rather than math to discover the distribution of parameter estimates. Variables on
both sides of the classical UEH model are expressed in their Moving Average (MA) models.
According to the correlogram test, we nd that for most currencies the rst six lags are
signicant,11 so the exchange rate change and the forward premium are expressed as AR(6)
models:
sj;t = 1 + 1sj;t 1 + 2sj;t 2 + ::: + 6sj;t 6 + j;t; (1.21)
fj;t = 2 + 1fj;t 1 + 2fj;t 2 + ::: + 6fj;t 6 + j;t: (1.22)
It turns out that the residuals  and  are non-normally distributed. Edward and John
(1979) provide a technique for a non-normal distribution number generator. This technique
accommodates a broad class of distributions because it transforms a uniform random number
into distribution with any desired set of values for the rst four statistical moments (mean,
variance, skewness and kurtosis). These four moments, denoted below as 1;2;3 and 4, are
functions of four parameters 1;2;3 and 4, as described in the following equations:















































  4B(1 + 33;1 + 4) + 6B(1 + 23;1 + 24)   4B(1 + 3;1 + 34);
(1.30)
11Remember that these are overlapping weekly observations of one-month returns and premia.The Forward Puzzle: Career Risk 30
where B(u;v) is the beta function. To generate the residuals we estimate their rst four
moments and numerically solve for the corresponding values of the 's. The desired non-
normal random number ~ R is the following transformation of a unit uniform random number
~ p:
R(~ p;) = 1 +
~ p3   (1   ~ p)4
2
: (1.31)
To test the null of no relation between s and f we generate 1000 numbers with the properties of
the observed sj, and, independently of that, 1000 numbers with the properties of the observed
fj. (The actual number of observations in the real-world sample is between 1030 and 1200.)
We then run on this data set all regressions we study in this paper and compute all betas we
are interested in. We repeat this 1000 times to get an idea of how the regression output is
distributed under the null.